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URL: http://www.nber.org/chapters/c0062The Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance (OASDI) program faces
a serious long-term solvency crisis. The 2001 Trustees’ Report projects that
the OASDI trust funds will be exhausted in 2038 and that an immediate and
permanent tax increase of 1.86 percent of taxable payroll will be needed to
restore solvency for the next seventy-ﬁve years. Over the past several years,
many Social Security reforms have been suggested to address the solvency
crisis, from further increases in the normal retirement age to partial priva-
tization of the system.
Many of these proposals would improve the ﬁscal balances of the
OASDI program by cutting beneﬁts, raising taxes, or both. However, the
ﬁscal implications of these reforms depend critically not just on the static
impacts of the reforms on beneﬁt payments and tax collections, but also on
dynamic responses of individuals to changes in program incentives. In par-
ticular, there is a large literature over the past two decades that suggests
that retirement decisions are responsive to the parameters of the Social Se-
curity system. If reform alters retirement patterns, this will in turn impact
beneﬁt payments and tax collections, both inside and outside the Social Se-
curity system. For example, if raising the early entitlement age for Social
Security leads to later retirement, this may signiﬁcantly improve the gov-
ernment’s ﬁscal position, above and beyond the savings from starting pay-
ments later in life.
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Working Group for helpful suggestions.While some previous studies of Social Security and retirement have fore-
cast the eﬀect of various reforms on labor supply, little work in the United
States has focused on the impact of reforms on the ﬁscal position of the
federal government. There has been little attempt, to date, to marry dy-
namic models of retirement responsiveness to estimates of the impact of re-
form on ﬁscal balances.
We propose to incorporate labor supply responses into our simulations
of the eﬀect of Social Security reforms on older workers’ net ﬁscal contri-
butions to OASDI. Such reforms will have both an automatic eﬀect on 
ﬁscal balances by changing contributions and beneﬁts for a given work his-
tory (the mechanical eﬀect), and an additional eﬀect through labor supply
responses to the reform (the behavioral eﬀect). We estimate the ﬁscal im-
plications of both the mechanical and the behavioral eﬀect, using retire-
ment models to predict labor supply responses. The result will be an esti-
mate of the steady-state impact of the reforms on the ﬁnancial balance
sheet of the OASDI program. We also include income and consumption
taxes in our analysis in order to examine the eﬀect of the reforms on total
government ﬁnances.
To be clear, we are not engaging in a full-blown solvency analysis along
the lines of that carried out by the Social Security Administration (SSA).
We do not consider the impact of reform on both transition and long-run
system ﬁnances. Rather, for illustrative purposes, we follow one cohort of
workers and illustrate the impacts of reforms on the beneﬁts paid to, and
the taxes collected from, this cohort. This gives some guide as to the per-
centage eﬀects of reforms on system balances.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. In section 12.1, we
provide some background on the Social Security program and on previous
literature on social security and retirement. In section 12.2, we discuss the
data and empirical strategy we employ to estimate the eﬀect of reforms on
workers’ net ﬁscal contributions to OASDI. In section 12.3, we present our
results. In section 12.4, we analyze the distribution eﬀects of the proposed
policy changes. In section 12.5, we conclude.
12.1 Background
12.1.1 Institutional Features of Social Security
As this paper focuses on labor supply responses to Social Security re-
form, a brief overview of the Social Security program is necessary to un-
derstand how the program aﬀects retirement; see Diamond and Gruber
(1998) for a more detailed review. An individual is entitled to retired worker
beneﬁts once he or she has worked forty quarters in covered employment.
Beneﬁts are calculated in several steps. Annual earnings are indexed by an
average wage index, and the thirty-ﬁve highest years of earnings are used
504 Courtney Coile and Jonathan Gruberto compute the average indexed monthly earnings (AIME).1 A progressive
formula is applied to the AIME to obtain the primary insurance amount
(PIA). Finally, the PIA is adjusted to obtain the monthly beneﬁt amount
based on when beneﬁts are ﬁrst received. Individuals claiming at the nor-
mal retirement age (NRA, legislated to grow slowly from 65 to 67) receive
the PIA. Individuals can receive beneﬁts as early as age 62 (the early re-
tirement age, or ERA), or can delay until age 70. Beneﬁts are reduced by
6.67 percent for each year of receipt prior to the NRA and are increased by
a delayed retirement credit of 3 percent to 8 percent for each year receipt
is postponed past the NRA, depending on the worker’s birth year.2 Beneﬁt
receipt is subject to an earnings test before age 65, whereby earnings above
a ﬂoor amount reduce current beneﬁts and cause them instead to be paid
out (with an actuarial adjustment) upon full retirement. Spouses of bene-
ﬁciaries also receive a dependent beneﬁt equal to 50 percent of the worker’s
PIA or a survivor beneﬁt equal to 100 percent of the worker’s PIA, al-
though the spouse receives only the larger of this and his or her own retired
worker beneﬁt. Beneﬁts are funded with a payroll tax of 12.4 percent, paid
half by employers and half by employees.
Additional work aﬀects social security wealth in several ways. First, the
additional year of earnings may replace an earlier year of zero or low earn-
ings in the AIME calculation, raising the monthly beneﬁt. Second, work
beyond age 62 implies a delay in claiming beneﬁts (if earnings are signiﬁ-
cantly above the earnings test ﬂoor). Beneﬁts are forgone for a year, but fu-
ture beneﬁts are higher due to the actuarial adjustment. Finally, additional
work results in additional payroll taxes. The combination of these three
eﬀects determines whether the Social Security system provides a return to
additional work that is more or less than actuarially fair.
12.1.2 Previous Related Literature
While there is little work that has incorporated labor supply responses to
Social Security reforms into estimates of the eﬀect of reforms on the 
government’s ﬁscal position, there is a large previous literature that has 
explored the eﬀect of Social Security on retirement decisions. A brief
overview of this literature follows; for a more detailed review, see Diamond
and Gruber (1998).
While a few studies have used aggregate information on the labor force
behavior of workers at diﬀerent ages to infer the role played by Social
Security, most studies have attempted to speciﬁcally model the role that
beneﬁts play in determining retirement decisions.3 Early studies estimated
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1. Earnings after age 60 are in nominal dollars, increasing the incentive to work at these ages.
2. The delayed retirement credit (DRC) is rising from 3 percent for workers born prior to
1925 to 8 percent for workers born after 1942. For workers with an NRA above 65, beneﬁts
are reduced 5 percent per year for receipt more than three years before the NRA.
3. Hurd (1990) and Ruhm (1995) are good examples of studies using aggregate data.reduced-form models of the retirement decision as a function of social se-
curity wealth,4 however, more recent literature has also incorporated in-
creases in wealth resulting from additional work. Some studies did this by
incorporating the accrual of social security wealth resulting from one ad-
ditional year of work, others by estimating structural models of retirement
decisions by workers facing a lifetime budget constraint.5 Typically, these
studies found that Social Security played an important role, albeit one that
could only explain a fraction of the decrease in older men’s labor supply
during the post-WWII era.
Stock and Wise (1990a, b) made the important observation that it is 
not simply the increment to retirement wealth with one additional year of
work that matters, but rather the entire evolution of future wealth with
further work. They developed an option value model that posited retire-
ment decisions as a function of the diﬀerence between the utility of re-
tirement at the current date and at the date that maximizes one’s utility.
The critical contribution of this approach is to model retirement decisions
in a forward-looking framework that considers the impact of the path of
future incentives on retirement. This approach was extended from ﬁrm-
speciﬁc to national data by Samwick (1998), and it shows once again the
modest eﬀects of Social Security, but much larger eﬀects of private pen-
sions.
Coile and Gruber (2000) recognized that the vast majority of variation
across individuals in option value resulted from wages, and they developed
an alternative measure—peak value—that measures the ﬁnancial gain
from delaying retirement to the age at which social security wealth is max-
imized. They also found that Social Security has a signiﬁcant but modest
eﬀect on retirement decisions.
A ﬁnal relevant article is Coile and Gruber (2001), which explores
whether the Social Security program provides strong incentives or disin-
centives for work at particular ages. They ﬁnd that, once payroll taxes are
included, the median male worker faces a small tax on work through the
Social Security system at ages 55 to 61, a near-zero tax at ages 62 to 64, and
a large tax at ages 65 to 69. The actuarial unfairness of the system at some
ages suggests that labor supply responses to Social Security reforms may
have a beneﬁcial eﬀect on the government’s ﬁscal position if the reforms
encourage more years of work at those ages.
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4. For more recent examples of this literature, see Diamond and Hausman (1984) and Blau
(1994).
5. For examples of the former, see Fields and Mitchell (1984) and Hausman and Wise
(1985); for examples of the latter, see Burtless (1986), Gustman and Steinmeier (1985, 1986),
and Rust and Phelan (1997).12.2 Data and Empirical Strategy
12.2.1 Data
The data used in the analysis is the Health and Retirement Study (HRS).
This is a survey of persons born 1931–1941 and their spouses, with inter-
views every two years, starting in 1992. The HRS contains extensive infor-
mation on employment, health, and family structure. For the purposes of
this paper, the critical feature is that the HRS is linked to Social Security
earnings histories, allowing accurate calculation of the retirement incen-
tives arising from Social Security.6
The sample for the analysis is all men and single women in the 1931–1941
birth cohorts who are working at age 55 and have nonmissing Social Secu-
rity records for themselves and their spouses. Beneﬁts accruing to married
women are included in their husband’s record (this includes the women’s
retired worker, dependent, and survivor beneﬁts). We assume that married
women retire at the initial ERA, that is, at 62. When we simulate reforms
to the system, we continue to assume that women retire at 62 and claim
beneﬁts at the ﬁrst availability. The purpose of maintaining the same re-
tirement age is to avoid building a behavioral response of women into the
mechanical eﬀect. The ﬁnal sample size is 3,060 persons.
For each person in our sample, we have earnings histories that can allow
us to compute his or her Social Security beneﬁt entitlement at each retire-
ment age (or age of death). The critical assumption involved in doing so is
projecting his or her earnings into future years. In our earlier work, we
found that these projections work best if we assume no real earnings
growth from the current age forward until retirement. Given these earnings
projections, we can also compute the payroll tax obligations of workers at
future ages.
A key contribution of our simulations is that we will consider the impact
on the entire government ﬁscal position, not just on Social Security in a
vacuum. Doing so requires modeling the impact of additional years of
work on income and consumption tax revenue as well, and we subse-
quently describe our approach for doing so. This approach does not pro-
vide a perfect picture of the full ﬁscal impact of reforms. For example, there
will be eﬀects on other, much smaller retirement income support programs
when Social Security is reformed, such as the Supplemental Security In-
come (SSI) program. But these eﬀects are diﬃcult to model, since these
other programs may also change through reform. We assume that the
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6. The HRS also includes information from employers on private pensions. In this analysis,
we will ignore pensions, as our focus is on Social Security reform, and it is diﬃcult to forecast
how pensions might change in response to a change in Social Security rules.eﬀects are suﬃciently modest that they do not bias our overall assessment
of the ﬁscal implications of reform.
12.2.2 Empirical Strategy
Our goal is to estimate how changes to the Social Security program
would aﬀect the net ﬁscal position of OASDI with respect to a particular
cohort of workers, those born between 1931 and 1941, who were working
at age 55. Once again, this approach is not designed to provide a full pic-
ture of the full implications of reform for program solvency. Rather, it pro-
vides a snapshot of the relative magnitude of eﬀects that may be observed
when reform impacts a particular slice of birth cohorts.
We calculate social security wealth in the base case for our sample of
age-55 workers and their families using the following approach. Each age-
55 worker will exit the labor force sometime over the next twenty years,
either by retiring or by dying prior to retirement.7Thus, there are forty pos-
sible exit paths out of the labor force, or forty states of the world, corre-
sponding to retirement or death at each age from 55 to 74. We obtain the
weighted average social security wealth by multiplying the probability of
each state by the social security wealth received in that state.
The probability of each state is obtained as follows. We calculate the con-
ditional probability of dying at each age from age- and sex-speciﬁc U.S. life
tables.8 We calculate the probability of retiring at each age conditional on
being in the labor force using models of retirement behavior from Coile
and Gruber (2004).9 The central results from that paper are reproduced in
table 12.1. We estimate retirement models as a function of both the level of
social security wealth (the expected PDV of net transfers from the Social
Security system from your current age forward), and two diﬀerent dynamic
measures of retirement incentives. The ﬁrst is option value, as pioneered by
Stock and Wise (1990a, b). This measure, as previously noted, captures the
diﬀerence between the utility of retiring today and retiring at the age when
utility is maximized, as a function of both future wages and retirement ben-
eﬁt entitlements. Thus, if this is positive, then there are gains to delaying re-
tirement, and these gains rise with the value of the option value term (so
that we expect a negative impact of option value on retirement). The sec-
ond is the peak value, as described in Coile and Gruber (2000). This mea-
sure focuses solely on retirement income as opposed to total ﬁnancial re-
turns to work, in order to distinguish retirement-income eﬀects from wage
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7. For the purpose of our calculation, we will assume everyone retires by age 74. We do not
use workers’ observed labor force exit, as many workers will not have exited the labor force by
the 2000 HRS. Rather, we use projected labor force exits from the empirical models described
herein.
8. Life tables are from the 1995 OASDI Trustees Report, intermediate assumptions case.
9. To be precise, this probability is also conditional on being alive at the beginning of this
age and not dying at this age. Thus, 100 percent of workers at each age are accounted for ei-
ther through exit to death, exit to retirement, or continued labor force participation.eﬀects (which might be unobservably correlated with tastes for work). So
this measure is the diﬀerence between the maximum value of the PDV of
retirement income and the value if the individual retires today. Once again,
as peak value is larger, the returns to delaying retirement rise, so that we ex-
pect a negative coeﬃcient in a retirement equation.
Both models also include controls for age, ﬂexible functions of earnings
and lifetime earnings, and education, race, region, industry, and occupa-
tion dummies. A central issue, which is the focus of our earlier paper, is the
correct approach to specifying the impact of age in these retirement mod-
els, particularly the use of age dummies versus linear age. If there are strong
correlations between wealth or dynamic incentives and particular ages,
then including age dummies might absorb some of the impacts of the pro-
gram on retirement decisions. On the other hand, if there are nonlinear im-
pacts of age on retirement decisions, then including a linear age term may
lead to biased estimates of the program’s incentive eﬀects. Thus, we esti-
mate the models both ways in table 12.1.
In this work, we have found fairly consistent evidence for signiﬁcant
Fiscal Eﬀects of Social Security Reform in the United States 509
Table 12.1 Retirement probits
Incentive variable
Peak value Option value
Age Linear Age Linear
dummies age dummies age
Male sample
SSW 0.1996 0.2926 0.1249 0.2010
(0.1395) (0.1344) (0.1363) (0.1331)
$10,000 change (0.0016) (0.0025) (0.0010) (0.0017)
Incentive measure –0.6618 –0.4983 –0.2106 –0.2368
(0.2750) (0.2927) (0.0522) (0.0539)
$1,000 change (–0.0005) (–0.0004)
Pseudo R2 0.1386 0.1386 0.1402 0.1402
Female sample
SSW 0.2574 0.2881 0.2200 0.2485
(0.1315) (0.1320) (0.1323) (0.1331)
$10,000 change (0.0020) (0.0022) (0.0017) (0.0019)
Incentive measure –0.0307 –0.0878 –0.2441 –0.2723
(0.3350) (0.3345) (0.0753) (0.0773)
$1,000 change (–0.00002) (–0.00007)
Pseudo R2 0.1530 0.1530 0.1530 0.1549
Notes: Dependent variable is whether the individual retires this year. Peak value and social security
wealth (SSW) are in 100,000s of $1992; option value is in 10,000. Regressions include controls for edu-
cation, race, experience, marital status, industry, occupation, region, and year, as well as a quartic in
earnings, a quartic in lifetime earnings, and the interactions of these quartics (plus same earnings vari-
ables for the spouse).eﬀects of program incentives on retirement decisions. Table 12.1 shows the
key coeﬃcients from these models. In each cell, we show the probit coeﬃ-
cient, the associated standard error, and the impact of a $10,000 increment
to SSW, or a $1,000 increment to peak value. For men, peak value and op-
tion value each have a negative and signiﬁcant eﬀect on retirement, while
social security wealth has a positive, though not always signiﬁcant, eﬀect.
The results suggest that each $10,000 in social security wealth raises the
odds of retirement by 0.1 to 0.25 percentage points, from a rate of 5.7 per-
centage points. Each $1,000 in peak value, on the other hand, lowers the
odds of retirement by 0.04 to 0.05 percentage points. We can’t really inter-
pret the option value coeﬃcient as such, since it is in utility terms. Our
results are fairly similar for women. The major diﬀerences are that the SSW
terms are more consistently signiﬁcant, and the peak value terms are now
insigniﬁcant.
We apply the coeﬃcients from those models to each individual’s charac-
teristics to obtain a predicted probability of retirement at each age for each
individual. That is, this model provides us with baseline estimates of re-
tirement by age.
Next, the expected net present discounted value of social security wealth
is calculated for each possible labor force exit path (retirement or death at
each of the twenty ages 55 to 74). For single workers, social security wealth
is simply a sum of future beneﬁts, discounted by time preference and sur-
vival probabilities. For married workers it is more complicated, since we
must include dependent spouse and survivor beneﬁts and retired worker
beneﬁts for the spouse, and account for the joint likelihood of survival of
the worker and dependent. We use a real discount rate of 3 percent and sur-
vival probabilities from the age- and sex-speciﬁc life tables. Finally, we mul-
tiply the probability of each state times the social security wealth in that
state for each individual, then average over all individuals to obtain the av-
erage base case social security wealth for the sample.
This same approach can then be used to compute the ﬁscal implications
of reform, in two steps. First, we measure the impact of reform on both so-
cial security wealth and on option/peak value at each age. We can then use
these new post-reform values to compute a new odds of retirement at each
age, based on our regression coeﬃcients in table 12.1. We assume that mor-
tality is not aﬀected by reform. Second, we multiply these new odds of exit
by the new stream of net SSW from either death or retirement at each age.
In this way, we obtain the new ﬁscal position for this cohort from reform.
As this discussion makes clear, however, there are two distinct eﬀects of
reform that are of interest: the ﬁscal eﬀects of reform that arise automati-
cally due to changes in program rules, and those that arise due to labor
supply responses. The mechanical eﬀect is the change in social security
wealth that arises solely from the change in program rules, holding retire-
ment probabilities constant, while the behavioral eﬀect is the additional
510 Courtney Coile and Jonathan Gruberchange in social security wealth that results from the change in retirement
probabilities, holding wealth constant at its postreform level. The ﬁscal
implications of the mechanical and behavioral eﬀects are calculated as fol-
lows:













































where i is individual, s is state (exit to death or retirement at each age), B is
base, and R is reform. Thus, the mechanical eﬀect is the impact of letting
SSW change from before to after reform, but holding retirement behavior
constant; the behavioral eﬀect is the impact of letting exit probabilities
change from before to after reform, but holding SSW constant. The sum of
the mechanical and behavioral eﬀects is equal to the total eﬀect.
The net present discounted value of income and consumption taxes are
computed using the same methodology as social security wealth. Again,
there are forty possible exit paths out of the labor force, and each path cor-
responds to certain expected future income ﬂows. For example, in the case
where the worker retires at age 55, there are three possible amounts of
household income in each future year, depending on whether the husband,
wife, or both are alive in that year. Taxes are computed for each of the three
possible income amounts, then the stream of taxes is discounted for time
preference and mortality risk. The income taxes paid each year are calcu-
lated using a simple tax calculator based on the 2000 U.S. income tax code;
households are assumed to take the standard deduction and tax rules re-
garding the taxation of Social Security beneﬁts are incorporated. Con-
sumption taxes are assumed to be 4.5 percent of income; 4.5 percent is the




We simulate three diﬀerent reforms to the U.S. Social Security system.
The ﬁrst reform is a three-year increase in the ERA and NRA, to 65 and
68, respectively (Three-Year Reform). This reform will signiﬁcantly reduce
social security wealth at any age, since beneﬁts receipt begins much later in
life. The reform will also reduce incentives for continued work at younger
ages, since the peak value of SSW is so much lower; but it will increase
Fiscal Eﬀects of Social Security Reform in the United States 511incentives for work after age 65, since the actuarial adjustment is now so
much larger in that age range.
The second reform is a change in the actuarial adjustment, to 6 percent
per year (Actuarial Reform). This is actually only a small change to the
current U.S. system, since the actuarial adjustment is equal to 6.67 percent
between ages 62 and 65 and is between 5 percent and 7.5 percent above age
65 for workers in these birth cohorts. But this is a much larger change in the
other countries in this project, which do not currently have actuarial ad-
justments. In the U.S. context, this change will lead to a reduction in SSW
at younger ages, which will promote retirement, but also a reduction in the
dynamic incentive to continue work. At older ages, the eﬀects will vary by
birth cohort.
The third reform is a move to a system with a ﬂat 60 percent replacement
rate of the AIME at age 65, an early eligibility age of 60, and a 6 percent
annual actuarial adjustment between ages 60 and 70 (Common Reform).10
The third policy is not viewed as being a realistic policy reform for the
United States, but is presented to illustrate the eﬀects of moving to a more
generous system, more similar to those in European countries. This policy
will signiﬁcantly increase social security wealth, leading to earlier retire-
ment, but will also signiﬁcantly increase the ﬁnancial beneﬁts to longer
work life, since the dollar beneﬁts from additional work are rising so sub-
stantially, while the actuarial adjustment is similar to current law.
One issue that arises in simulating policy reforms is how the reforms will
aﬀect individuals’ tendency to retire at particular ages, as reﬂected by the
age dummies in the retirement model. For example, two of the three poli-
cies change the early retirement age, and it seems quite likely that the spike
in the retirement hazard at age 62 might be altered as a result of the change.
However, it is diﬃcult to predict exactly how the retirement hazard might
change. We propose to deal with this issue by using two alternative as-
sumptions about the age dummies. The ﬁrst is to leave the age dummies un-
changed by the policies, and the second is to shift the age dummies as seems
appropriate. For the ﬁrst policy, we shift the age dummies back by three
years, so that the age 62 spike is moved to age 65, the age 65 spike to age 68,
and so on. For the second policy, the age dummies are unaﬀected, while for
the third policy, we shift the age 62 dummy to age 60 and make several other
small adjustments. We also present results using the linear age model.
12.3.2 Results
The results of the analysis for the typical age-55 household, averaging
over married couples and singles, are shown in table 12.2. We present six
panels, corresponding to the six speciﬁcations we estimate: linear age,
512 Courtney Coile and Jonathan Gruber





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.age dummies with no shift in their value from reform, and age dummies
with a shift in value from reform, each for the peak and option value
models. In each panel, we show rows for: Social Security beneﬁts, payroll
taxes, income taxes, consumption taxes, and total tax payments. We show
columns for the base case, and then for each of the three reforms. Finally,
the last three columns show the percentage eﬀects from each of the three
reforms.
Consider the ﬁrst panel, which shows the peak value model, with linear
age controls. In the base case, averaging over the forty possible labor force
exit paths, the typical age-55 household has expected future Social Secu-
rity beneﬁts of €196,503 (2001 euros), expected future Social Security pay-
roll taxes of €58,681, and expected total future taxes of €180,191. It is im-
portant to note that the majority of future tax payments come not from
payroll taxes but from income taxes. This highlights the value of govern-
ment-wide simulations, as opposed to simulations that focus on the Social
Security system in a vacuum.
The total eﬀect of the Three-Year Reform is to lower beneﬁts, in this case
by 18.3 percent to €160,526. Payroll taxes rise, as do income taxes, due to
longer working lives. But consumption taxes fall, as the higher labor in-
come does not oﬀset lower Social Security beneﬁts, leading to falling dis-
posable income. In total, tax revenues rise by 2.1 percent, to €183,983.
The eﬀect of the Actuarial Reform is much smaller; beneﬁts rise by only
1.1 percent and taxes fall by 0.8 percent. The eﬀect of the Common Reform
is the largest of all, with a rise in beneﬁt payments of 43.6 percent and a to-
tal rise in tax payments of 4.4 percent. All six models (peak value versus
option value, linear age versus age dummies, with or without shift) gener-
ate similar predictions of the eﬀect of the reforms on beneﬁts, though the
eﬀect of the reforms on taxes varies more across the models.
Table 12.3 decomposes the total eﬀect of reform into two components,
the mechanical eﬀect and the behavioral eﬀect. Once again, we present one
panel for each estimated model. Each panel has three sets of columns for
the three reforms. In each set of columns, we show the mechanical eﬀect,
the behavioral eﬀect, and the total eﬀect of reform.
In the case of Social Security beneﬁts, the mechanical eﬀect is respon-
sible for the vast majority of the total eﬀect. For example, in the peak value
model with linear age controls, the Three-Year Reform mechanically cuts
beneﬁts by €35,934. Incorporating labor supply responses to the reform
has an additional beneﬁcial eﬀect on program solvency, but the eﬀect is
very small: beneﬁts drop by a further €44, or less than 0.1 percent of base
case beneﬁts. In some of the other models, the behavioral response to this
reform actually results in an increase in beneﬁts—for example, in the op-
tion value model with age dummy shift, beneﬁts rise by €1,249. However,
in all models, the magnitude of the behavioral eﬀect remains very small rel-
ative to the magnitude of the mechanical eﬀect.




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.This is the case for the other two reforms as well. For both the Actuarial
Reform and the Common Reform, the vast majority of the eﬀect on Social
Security payments is through the mechanical eﬀect.
In the case of taxes, the behavioral eﬀect is often larger than the me-
chanical eﬀect and can vary signiﬁcantly across models. For example, in the
first panel of table 12.3, the mechanical eﬀect of the Three-Year Reform 
is to reduce taxes by €2,706, while the behavioral eﬀect is to raise taxes by
€6,499, so that taxes increase on net. For this reform, the behavioral eﬀect
on taxes is particularly pronounced in the models with age dummy shifts 
in the third and sixth panels. On the other hand, for the Common Reform,
the mechanical eﬀects of taxes are much larger in all cases, although the
oﬀsetting behavioral eﬀects are of a similar order of magnitude in the op-
tion value model with shifting age dummies.
The ﬁnal rows of each panel in table 12.3 show the net change in the gov-
ernment’s ﬁscal position for this cohort as a result of reform, and that net
change as a percentage of baseline beneﬁts. For the Three-Year Reform, we
ﬁnd that there is a total reduction in net government outlays of roughly
€40,000 to €47,000, depending on the model. This represents 28 to 35 per-
cent of baseline beneﬁts. The majority of this impact comes from mechan-
ical eﬀects. At most one third, and generally less than one ﬁfth, comes from
behavioral eﬀects, and this is exclusively through the tax side.
As noted, the impacts of the Actuarial Reform are much more modest.
There is an increase in government outlays of €3,000–€3,800, or 2–2.8 per-
cent of baseline beneﬁt payments. In this case, behavioral eﬀects play a
larger role, explaining about one third of the total change in ﬁscal position.
The Common Reform has the most substantial impact on ﬁscal posi-
tions. Net payments rise by over 50 percent in all simulations. This case
also features the smallest relative contribution from behavioral responses;
only about 10 percent or less of the eﬀect of reform comes through behav-
ioral responses. This is because most of the ﬁscal impact of this reform is
on the beneﬁts side, not the tax side, so that the small behavioral eﬀect on
beneﬁts implies a small behavioral eﬀect overall.
To better understand why the ﬁscal implications of the behavioral eﬀect
on social security wealth are relatively small, it is useful to recall that this
is the additional eﬀect of labor supply responses on ﬁscal balances, hold-
ing social security wealth constant at the postreform level. In order for the
labor supply responses to have an additional eﬀect on Social Security ﬁ-
nances, two conditions must be met: reforms must signiﬁcantly impact re-
tirement decisions, and the Social Security system (beneﬁts net of payroll
taxes) must be less or more than actuarially fair. Even if there is no addi-
tional beneﬁcial eﬀect on Social Security program ﬁnances, reforms may
improve overall government ﬁnances if they encourage workers to retire
later and this results in higher lifetime income and consumption taxes.
Figure 12.1 shows Social Security beneﬁts by age of retirement in the
518 Courtney Coile and Jonathan Gruberbase case and in the Three-Year Reform case. In the base case, social secu-
rity wealth rises with age of retirement until peaking at age 69, making it
appear that the system provides some return to additional work. However,
when payroll taxes are included, the system is close to actuarially fair. For
example, social security wealth in the base case rises from about €195,000
at age 60 to about €234,000 at age 69; however, the increase in payroll taxes
over the same period (not shown on the graph) is about €44,000, making
the net return to additional work a loss of approximately €5,000. Under the
Three-Year Reform, beneﬁts are lower but the system (including payroll
taxes) remains roughly actuarially fair. Thus, even if this policy change in-
duces people to change their retirement behavior, such changes will have
little ﬁscal impact on the Social Security system, because it is close to ac-
tuarially fair.
Figure 12.2illustrates how the sum of payroll, income, and consumption
taxes varies with age of retirement. As discussed previously with respect to
payroll taxes, the present discounted value of lifetime taxes rises with age,
and this is true for other types of taxes as well. However, while the rise in
payroll taxes roughly counteracts the rise in Social Security beneﬁts with
later labor force exit, the total rise in taxes greatly exceeds the rise in bene-
ﬁts. As a result, the net ﬁscal implications of longer work lives is positive:
while Social Security is roughly actuarially fair, the increase in income and
consumption taxes imply gains to the government from longer work lives.
Figure 12.3 shows the distribution of retirement ages pre- and postre-
form in the option value model with no shift of the age dummies. The re-
form is found to reduce the probability of retirement slightly at ages 55 to
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Fig. 12.1 Social Security beneﬁts by age of labor force exit, Three-Year Reform64 and to increase it slightly at ages 66 to 74. But these eﬀects are, in gen-
eral, fairly small. Thus, it should not be surprising that there is relatively
little behavioral eﬀect on ﬁscal positions from this reform: there is rela-
tively little impact on behavior, and any changes in behavior have modest
impacts, because the system is roughly actuarially fair.
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Fig. 12.2 Total taxes by age of labor force exit, Three-Year Reform
Fig. 12.3 Distribution of retirement ages, Three-Year Reform, option value—age
dummies (no shift)Figure 12.4 puts the information in ﬁgures 12.1 to 12.3 together to show
the total eﬀect of the reform on social security wealth, both gross and net
of all taxes, by age of retirement. The gross and net eﬀects by age are always
negative, as this reform is a large beneﬁt cut. The eﬀects are largest at ages
62 to 65, because the retirement probabilities are relatively high at these
ages; put simply, most of the ﬁscal savings from this reform come from
people who retire at ages 62 to 65, because there are so many of them.
Figures 12.5 and 12.6repeat ﬁgures 12.3 and 12.4, under the assumption
that the age dummies shift by three years as a result of the reform. Here,
there are much larger behavioral responses to reform, since we are by con-
struction assuming that there is an enormous change in retirement behav-
ior (by shifting the age dummy coeﬃcients). As one would expect, the re-
tirement probabilities now decline sharply at ages 62 to 64 and rise sharply
at ages 65 to 68. As a result, the reform now saves a larger amount of money
at ages 62 to 64, since there are so many fewer people retiring then, but
costs more money at ages 66 to 68 because of the increase in people retir-
ing at those ages.
Finally, ﬁgure 12.7 compares the ﬁscal implications of reform for one
birth cohort as a percentage of GDP for the six models used. In all cases,
the mechanical eﬀect leads to a savings of about 0.45 percent of GDP and
the behavioral eﬀect leads to an additional savings of about 0.10 percent of
GDP, and slightly more in models with age dummy shifts. Thus we con-
clude that most of the eﬀect of the policy reform on government ﬁnances
results from the mechanical eﬀect of the change. Labor supply responses
to the policy have little additional eﬀect on Social Security program sol-
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Fig. 12.4 Total eﬀect by age of retirement, Three-Year Reform, option value—age
dummies (no shift)vency because the system is close to actually fair, though they do have a
small beneﬁcial eﬀect on total government ﬁnances as a result of higher
lifetime income and consumption taxes paid.
Next, we examine whether this ﬁnding will also apply to the two other re-
forms, the Actuarial Reform and the Common Reform. Figure 12.8 shows
that the system is roughly actuarially fair (once payroll taxes are included)
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Fig. 12.5 Distribution of retirement ages, Three-Year Reform, option value—age
dummies (with shift)
Fig. 12.6 Total eﬀect by age of retirement, Three-Year Reform, option value—age
dummies (with shift)in both the base case and Actuarial Reform. Figure 12.9 shows that there
are only small changes in retirement probabilities resulting from this re-
form in the option value model with no age dummy shift. Figure 12.10, like
ﬁgure 12.7, compares the ﬁscal implications of this reform using all six
models. As the reform represents only a small change from the current U.S.
system, it is found to cause a mechanical increase in the cost of the program
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Fig. 12.7 Fiscal implications of reform as a percent of GDP: Three-Year Reform
Fig. 12.8 Social Security beneﬁts by age of labor force exit, Actuarial Reformof only 0.03 percent of GDP; the behavioral eﬀect raises the cost by an ad-
ditional 0.01 percent–0.02 percent of GDP.
Figures 12.11 to 12.13 explore the eﬀects of the Common Reform. Un-
der this reform, the system is now more than actuarially fair, as the gener-
ous 60 percent replacement rate rewards additional work by more than
enough to oﬀset the additional payroll taxes. For example, working from
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Fig. 12.9 Distribution of retirement ages, Actuarial Reform, option value—age
dummies (no shift)
Fig. 12.10 Fiscal implications of reform as a percentage of GDP: Actuarial Reformage 60 to age 69 raises social security wealth net of payroll taxes by over
€41,000. Due to the wealth eﬀect, this reform induces people to retire ear-
lier, as shown in ﬁgure 12.12; as the system is more than fair, earlier retire-
ment will beneﬁt Social Security program ﬁnances, though it will hurt
overall government ﬁnances by lowering lifetime income and consumption
taxes. As shown in ﬁgure 12.13, the ﬁscal implications of this reform are a
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Fig. 12.11 Social Security beneﬁts by age of labor force exit, Common Reform
Fig. 12.12 Distribution of retirement ages, Common Reform, option value—age
dummies (no shift)mechanical increase in program costs of almost 1 percent of GDP and an
additional increase in costs of 0.1 percent–0.2 percent of GDP as a result
of the behavioral response, as workers retire earlier and pay fewer taxes.
To restate our central conclusion, the ﬁscal implication of the behavioral
eﬀect is quite small relative to the mechanical eﬀect of the reforms, typi-
cally on the order of 10–20 percent of the total eﬀect. Reforms may lead to
signiﬁcant changes in retirement behavior, particularly in models includ-
ing shifts of the age dummies. However, as the Social Security system (in-
cluding payroll taxes) is roughly actuarially fair, inducing earlier or later re-
tirement has only a second-order eﬀect on program solvency, though it
may aﬀect overall government ﬁnances by changing the amount of lifetime
income and consumption taxes paid.
12.4 Distributional Analysis
Finally, we examine the eﬀect of these reforms on people in diﬀerent
parts of the income distribution. Tables 12.4 and 12.5show the eﬀect of the
three reforms by family AIME quintile using the option value models, ﬁrst
without (table 12.4) and then with (table 12.5) shifts of the age dummies.
This comparison implicitly highlights the importance of behavioral eﬀects,
since these eﬀects are much larger in the model with age dummy shifts.
In the model without an age dummy shift, the Three-Year Reform is
found to aﬀect all quintiles similarly: the change in Social Security beneﬁts
net of all taxes is equal to a loss of 19.8 percent of base beneﬁts for the top
526 Courtney Coile and Jonathan Gruber






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.quintile versus a loss of 17.7 percent of base beneﬁts for the lowest quintile;
naturally, the absolute dollar losses are much larger for the top quintile. In
the model with an age dummy shift, however, the top quintile experiences
a relatively larger loss, 25.2 percent versus 18.9 percent for the lowest quin-
tile. This suggests, therefore, that the behavioral response to the reform is
either reducing beneﬁts or increasing tax payments by a larger amount 
for the highest income quintiles. This eﬀect appears to operate mostly
through taxes: given that income taxes are progressive, longer work lives
lead to a larger increase in tax payments over the work life for higher-
income groups. That is, the longer work life in table 12.5 relative to table
12.4 leads to about €18,000 more in tax payments for the highest income
quintile, but only €2,500 more for the lowest income group.
In the Actuarial Reform, gains are small for all quintiles, though they are
twice as large as a percent of base beneﬁts (2.1 percent versus 0.9 percent)
for the highest quintile relative to the lowest.
In the Common Reform, by contrast, beneﬁts are highly skewed toward
the upper quintiles, even in percentage terms. This is because the Common
Reform replaces the progressive beneﬁt formula in the current system with
a ﬂat 60 percent replacement rate. The top quintile receives an increase in
social security wealth net of all taxes equal to 61.6 percent of base beneﬁts,
while the bottom quintile receives an increase equal to just 4.7 percent of
base beneﬁts; results are similar in the model with shifts of the age dummy.
12.5 Conclusions
Any Social Security reform designed to improve the solvency of the
OASDI trust funds will automatically have a beneﬁcial eﬀect on Social Se-
curity program ﬁnances by cutting beneﬁts or raising taxes (the mechani-
cal eﬀect). But the reform may have an additional beneﬁcial eﬀect on pro-
gram ﬁnances (the behavioral eﬀect) if it encourages workers to retire later
and if the Social Security system is less than actuarially fair. Even if there
is no eﬀect on program ﬁnances, the reform may have a beneﬁcial eﬀect on
government ﬁnances if it leads workers to retire later and raises the lifetime
income and consumption taxes they pay.
We have developed here a microsimulation model to estimate the impact
of several reforms to the Social Security system. This model incorporates
the behavioral responses of retirement to Social Security entitlements esti-
mated in our earlier work. We have two key ﬁndings from this exercise.
First, major reforms to the system can have substantial impacts on ﬁscal
balances. Raising the early and normal retirement age by three years im-
proves net ﬁscal balances by roughly one third of baseline beneﬁts. On the
other hand, reducing the early retirement age to 60 and raising the replace-
ment rate to 60 percent would lead to a deterioration of ﬁscal balances by
over one half of baseline beneﬁts.
Fiscal Eﬀects of Social Security Reform in the United States 529Second, behavioral responses to system reforms only contribute mod-
estly to ﬁscal balance eﬀects. This is because the Social Security system as
a whole is roughly actuarially neutral. As a result, delaying retirement has
little net impact on system ﬁnances. However, when other taxes are fac-
tored in, delaying retirement does increase net government revenue. Thus,
behavioral eﬀects on the system as a whole are not zero, but are dominated
by the mechanical eﬀects of reform.
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